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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE NO. 1; Did the lower court err in concluding as a 
matter of law that Defendant was given a warning of the 
consequences of submitting to a blood draw sufficient under 
statutory and constitutional standards. 
A trial court's conclusions of law in criminal cases are 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 
(Utah 1993) . See also. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 
1994) (" [C]orrectness means the appellate court decides the 
matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial 
judge's determination of law.") 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the lower court erred in finding as a 
matter of fact that Defendant consented to the blood draw. 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 
n. 2 (Utah 1988). See also. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 
(Utah 1994) (A trial court's finding is clearly erroneous when it 
is against the clear weight of the evidence or, although there is 
evidence to support it, the court reviewing the record evidence 
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made.); State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) ("we 
deferentially review the trial court's determination that 
2 
defendant consented to the blood test, as is appropriate with all 
factual determinations."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(1)(b): 
In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 
41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical 
test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution. 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(1)(a): 
A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test 
or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose 
of determining whether he was operating or in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited 
under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if the test 
is or tests are administered at the direction of a 
peace officer having grounds to believe that person to 
have been operating or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol 
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 
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Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) and (b) : 
(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has 
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any 
one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), 
and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one 
or all of the tests requested, the person shall be 
warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests 
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) Following this warning under Subsection (a), if 
the person does not immediately request that the 
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, 
on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate 
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke .... 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3): 
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit 
to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), 
and the test or tests may be administered whether the 
person has been arrested or not. 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(7): 
For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a 
chemical test or tests, the person to be tested does 
not have the right to consult an attorney or have an 
attorney, physician, or other person present as a 
condition for the taking of any test. 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(8): 
If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical test or tests or any additional test under 
this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out 
of acts alleged to have been committed while the person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol .... 
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Utah Code § 53-3-223(1) (a) : 
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to believe 
that a person may be violating or has violated Section 
41-6-44, ... the peace officer may, in connection with 
arresting the person, request that the person submit to 
a chemical test or tests to be administered in 
compliance with the standards under Section 41-6-44.10. 
Utah Code § 53-3-223(2): 
The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the 
person's submission to a chemical test that a test 
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-
6-44.6 shall, and the existence of a blood alcohol 
content sufficient to render the person incapable of 
safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in 
suspension or revocation of the person's license to 
drive a motor vehicle. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal prosecution for driving under the 
influence of alcohol ("DUI"). Defendant's vehicle rounded a 
corner, crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming 
vehicle. Officer Newren found Defendant reclined in the driver's 
seat, with both Defendant and his vehicle smelling strongly of 
alcohol. Defendant was transported to a hospital, where he was 
treated for relatively minor injuries. Defendant is hearing 
impaired. Officer Newren went to the hospital and, based on his 
observations, arrested Defendant for DUI. Officer Newren, 
without reference to a printed form, explained from memory Utah's 
Implied Consent law to Defendant. Officer Newren requested 
Defendant to submit to a blood draw. Officer Newren considered 
Defendant's conduct to be consent to the blood draw. Defendant 
submitted to a blood draw. The result was a blood/alcohol 
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content ("BAC") level of .15%. The City of Orem ("the City") 
brought criminal charges. 
Proceedings in Trial Court 
In a suppression hearing held on April 14, 1994, Defendant 
moved to suppress the BAC result on two grounds: (1) Officer 
Newren did not comply with the requirements of the implied 
consent law; (2) Defendant, because of his hearing impairment, 
could not and did not consent to the blood draw. The trial court 
denied the motion to suppress. Trial proceeded by proffer and 
stipulation on April 25, 1994. The trial court convicted based 
on a stipulated .15% BAC. (Trial Transcript, p. 4-8). Defendant 
appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. 
Statement of Facts 
On January 25, 1994 at approximately 7:12 p.m. Officer Scott 
Newren of the Orem Department of Public Safety was dispatched to 
an automobile accident in the area of 487 South Carterville1 
Road in Orem, Utah. Suppression Transcript, p. 3. When Officer 
Newren arrived at the accident scene he observed the results of a 
head-on collision, caused after Defendant's southbound Toyota 
Celica rounded a corner, crossed the center line, and collided 
with an oncoming northbound Buick. Id. at 4. As he approached 
the Celica, Officer Newren observed Defendant reclined in the 
driver's seat. Id. at 5. Defendant had blood on his face, 
apparently caused by one or more facial wounds. Id. Officer 
Newren smelled "a strong odor of alcoholic beverage in the 
1
 The transcript incorrectly indicates "Cardinal" Road. 
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vehicle." Id. Defendant was extracted from his vehicle and 
transported to Orem Community Hospital for medical attention. 
Id. at 5, 6. Following police procedure in injury accident 
cases, Officer Newren went to the hospital, where he again 
smelled a strong odor of alcoholic beverage about Defendant. Id. 
at 6. Defendant indicated to Officer Newren, and previously to 
the hospital staff, that he was hearing impaired. Id. at 9. At 
some point prior to arrest, Defendant told Officer Newren that he 
had consumed a mixed drink earlier in the evening. Id. at 6. 
Officer Newren performed only the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, 
requiring no voluntary movement by the person tested. Id. at 8. 
Officer Newren informed defendant that he was under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol. Id. at 6. Because of 
defendant's injuries, Officer Newren did not ask him to perform 
field sobriety tests; instead, Officer Newren "felt it was more 
important just to have a blood draw." Id. at 7-8. Though 
Officer Newren was aware of Defendant's hearing impairment, he 
felt Defendant could understand him by reading lips. Id. at 9. 
Consequently, prior to requesting blood from Defendant, Officer 
Newren conveyed to him Utah's Implied Consent Law as follows: 
"Basically the same as they're written in the admonitions of 
[sic] the back of the [DUI] report form, that he does have the 
right to refuse, if he does this, his license can be revoked for 
one year without a provision for a limited license. That a 
result indicating .08 or greater could result in the denial of 
his license for three months." Id. at 9. Officer Newren asked 
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Defendant if he could perform a blood draw to which Defendant 
replied affirmatively by nodding his head and saying "Okay," Id. 
at 14-16. Defendant was alert at this time. Id. at 12. 
Defendant's hearing condition unquestionably made communication 
more problematic than it would have been if Defendant was not 
hearing impaired. Id. at 13. Officer Newren testified that he 
showed Defendant both a blood draw consent form and a signature 
form (see Exhibit #1, Addenda), explained both forms to 
Defendant, and watched Defendant sign the signature form. Id. at 
10. Soon after, Officer Newren watched while a registered nurse 
drew blood from Defendant. Id. The blood draw occurred at 
21:00 hours or nine o'clock p.m., about one (1) hour and forty-
five (45) minutes after the accident. See Exhibit #1, Addenda, 
and compare with the 7:12 p.m. time of the accident dispatch. 
There is no indication or claim that the blood draw occurred in 
any untoward manner. During the blood draw, Defendant neither 
wriggled nor resisted the test, nor did he seem surprised it was 
occurring. Suppression Transcript, p. 10. The test result 
showed a .15% BAC. Trial Transcript, p. 4; see also. Exhibit #2, 
Addenda. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The City's argument proceeds as follows: Since Defendant 
was under arrest for DUI, the City has no affirmative duty to 
show he consented to the blood draw, because consent is implied 
by law. Defendant's hearing impairment does not affect his 
implied consent. Even if the City must show consent to the draw, 
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the record shows Defendant consented. 
Officer Newren complied with his obligations to convey to 
Defendant his rights under the implied consent law. Even if 
Officer Newren did not properly convey the implied consent law to 
Defendant, Officer Newren's supposed non-compliance did not 
preclude proper admission of Defendant's BAC results in a 
criminal prosecution. Non-compliance can only preclude 
admission of BAC tests in a criminal prosecution where either the 
Rules of Evidence prevent admission of the test, or Defendant's 
constitutional rights are violated in acquiring his blood sample. 
Neither the Rules of Evidence nor the constitution prevented 
proper admission of Defendant's BAC test result. 
Even if Defendant did not consent to the blood draw, the 
test result was properly admissible because of the overall 
reasonableness of Officer Newren's actions. 
ARGUMENT 
WHERE A DUI SUSPECT IS ARRESTED THE GOVERNMENT HAS NO 
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO SHOW CONSENT. 
Defendant claims there was no consent to the blood draw. 
Under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2)(a), where a DUI suspect is under 
arrest, the government has no affirmative duty to show consent to 
submit to a BAC test, because such consent is implied by law. 
Since consent is implied when a driver uses the road, the only 
showing the government must make regarding an arrested defendant 
is that he/she was asked to take the test. Case law is clear on 
this question. See, e.g., Clontz v. Jensen, 416 N.W.2d 577 
(Neb. 1987)("The only understanding required by the licensee is 
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that he has been asked to take a test. It is not a defense that 
he does not understand the consequences of a refusal . . . . " ) ; 
State v. Webb, 443 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. App. 1994) ("In all cases the 
court is required to find only that the implied consent law was 
conveyed to the suspect driver. The State is under no duty to 
prove the suspect driver fully understood his rights under the 
implied consent law. In this respect a hearing impaired driver 
does not have greater rights and privileges than a hearing 
driver.")(emphasis in original); People v. Thorson, 496 N.E.2d 
304 (111. App. 1986)("consent is implied, so that there need not 
be an affirmative showing of consent."); People v. Rosario, 518 
N.Y.S.2d 906 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1987)("Contrary to defendant's 
contention, the People have no obligation to establish, as a 
condition precedent to admission of a breathalyzer test results 
at trial, that defendant affirmatively consented to take the 
test. Rather, ... such consent is deemed to have been given when 
defendant used the highway . . . . " ) ; State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 
(Utah App. 1988)("R.L.I, stands only for the proposition that if 
an arrest has not taken place, the subject is entitled to know 
the purpose for which the blood is drawn and the subject may 
withdraw the statutory implied consent.")(emphasis added)(citing 
Interest of R.L.I., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) (rev'd on 
other grounds). 
Under these authorities, when Defendant used the road he 
impliedly consented to submit to the blood draw, and that consent 
remained in force at all times, since he did not expressly 
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withdraw his consent. According to Defendant's testimony, he 
knew he was asked to take a test, and he consented to it, both 
impliedly and in fact, though he claims he thought the test was 
for a purpose other than BAC testing. Suppression Transcript, p. 
41, 43; see also, Exhibit #1, Addenda.' 
DEFENDANT'S HEARING IMPAIRMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
WITHDRAWAL OF HIS IMPLIED CONSENT. 
Defendant argues that even if Officer Newren adequately 
conveyed the implied consent law admonitions to him, Defendant's 
status as a hearing impaired person and his involvement in the 
accident prevented his being able to consent to the blood draw. 
However, since Defendant was under arrest, his consent is 
implied, and the government therefore is not required to show 
express consent. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(3) reads: 
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit 
to any chemical test or tests is considered to not have 
withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), 
and the test or tests may be administered whether the 
person has been arrested or not. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Even if Defendant's status as a hearing impaired person or 
his alleged status of being confused after the accident prevented 
him from understanding the implied consent admonitions, his BAC 
test is still admissible under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3), quoted 
above. Being confused or hearing impaired constitutes "any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal." Under a plain 
reading of the above-quoted language, Defendant is "considered to 
not have withdrawn his consent." Id. (emphasis added). 
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Such a reading of the statute is consistent with case law 
from other jurisdictions. In State v. Webb, 443 S.E.2d 630 (Ga. 
App. 1994) a hearing impaired driver was arrested DUI. The 
driver claimed the State should have had in place a system 
whereby it could provide access to an interpreter, which, unlike 
the statutory scheme in Utah, is qualifiedly required under 
Georgia's implied consent law. The court stated that inability 
to understand the officer did not constitute a withdrawal of the 
defendant's consent: 
[T]he defendant's inability to understand the officer 
did not constitute a "withdrawal" of his implied 
consent. That the officer conveys to the driver his 
right to an additional test is the most the law now 
requires before depriving the state of its right to 
introduce the test evidence at trial. ... We need not 
decide such issues because the State proved that the 
arresting officer conveyed Webb's implied rights to him 
within the meaning of the implied consent law, to which 
all drivers are subject. The state is under no duty to 
show appellee's affirmative waiver of an additional 
chemical test. 
Id. at 632 (emphasis in original). 
The analysis in Webb was based on an earlier decision 
involving language barriers. In State v. Tosar, 350 S.E.2d 811 
(Ga. App. 1986), the Spanish speaking DUI defendant claimed that 
since he did not understand one of the aspects of the implied 
consent law conveyed by the English speaking officer, he could 
not knowingly waive one of his rights. After finding the 
defendant could not understand the officer and therefore was not 
informed of his rights under the implied consent law, the trial 
court suppressed the evidence. On appeal, the state argued that 
because of the Spanish speaking defendant's inability to 
12 
understand the English speaking officer, the defendant fell into 
the category of "otherwise incapable of refusal" under Georgia's 
statute. Id. at 812. The appellate court agreed with the state: 
This contention has merit where the statute is read to 
mean that the inability to understand the rights read 
in English rendered the non-English speaking appellee's 
condition "the same as unconscious, i.e., in a 
noncommunicative condition." [citation omitted] ... 
[A]ppellee's inability to understand him rendered him 
non-communicative. 
Id. 
Tosar was ultimately decided on different grounds. Tosar 
and Webb both had to do with a defendant not understanding a 
particular component of Georgia's implied consent law. Both 
cases, however, support the proposition that inability to 
communicate, whether because of hearing impairment or because of 
a language barrier, constitutes a condition inclusive under the 
"any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal" language 
of Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(3). If Defendant's condition rendered 
him noncommunicative, his consent to submit to the BAC test was 
implied, and his non-communicative status does not serve as a 
withdrawal of his consent. 
EVEN IF CONSENT IS REQUIRED, THE RECORD SHOWS DEFENDANT 
CONSENTED TO THE BLOOD DRAW. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in finding consent. 
While the City argues voluntary consent is not necessary for the 
BAC test to be admissible, even if consent is required, the 
record shows Defendant gave voluntary consent to the blood draw. 
When consent is challenged, the government bears the burden 
of showing consent by meeting the following burden of proof: 
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(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that 
the consent was "unequivocable and specific" and 
"freely and intelligently given"; 
(2) the government must prove consent was given 
without duress or coercion, express or implied; 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights 
and there must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived. 
State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) . 
This three-prong.standard is cumulative. The government 
must show each prong by a preponderance of the evidence. State 
v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4 (Utah App. 1994) ("we believe Brown's 
approval of the preponderance of the evidence standard controls 
and that standard is appropriate for all cases dealing with 
voluntariness of consent."). 
Officer Newren's testimony was that after he told Defendant 
why a test was being requested and after explaining Defendant's 
right to refuse, Defendant nodded his head in the affirmative and 
said "Okay." Defendant did not wriggle, seem surprised, or 
resist during the blood draw. Suppression Transcript, p. 10, 16. 
Also, based on his own communications with Defendant and 
that of the personnel treating Defendant before Officer Newren's 
arrival at the hospital, Officer Newren "felt that Mr. Solomon 
was able to understand me if I were to look at him directly so he 
could read my lips. I feel that he's a very good lip reader." 
Id. at 9, 14. 
Moreover, Defendant signed a blood draw consent form. Id. 
at 41, 43; see also. Exhibit #1, Addenda. It is very clear 
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Defendant knew he was being asked to submit to a blood draw, 
although he claims he did not know what the draw was for. 
Suppression Transcript, 41, 43. 
Additional communications occurred. Defendant told Officer 
Newren about consuming a mixed drink prior to the accident. Id. 
at 6. Defendant indicated to Officer Newren that he was hearing 
impaired. Id. at 9. 
As to express or implied coercion or duress, notwithstanding 
Defendant's claim that he was in a dynamic environment, with 
people poking things in his face (id. at 41) , the record shows 
one officer telling Defendant why he wanted a blood draw, with 
one nurse in the background preparing a blood draw kit. Id. at 
16. Again, Defendant did not resist or seem surprised the draw 
was taking place. Id. at 10. 
Even indulging every presumption against waiver of 
fundamental rights in favor of Defendant, under a preponderance 
of the evidence standard, these facts show the trial court was 
correct in finding as a matter of fact that there was consent, 
and its ruling should be upheld under the clearly erroneous 
standard. 
OFFICER NEWREN MET HIS DUTIES UNDER THE 
IMPLIED CONSENT LAW. 
Defendant claims Officer Newren did not give him a 
sufficient warning of the consequences of submitting to the blood 
draw. In Utah, the only warning the officer must give an 
arrested defendant is that refusal can result in revocation. 
Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 (2) (a) reads: 
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(a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has 
then been requested by a peace officer to submit to any 
one or more of the chemical tests under Subsection (1), 
and refuses to submit to the chemical test or any one 
or all of the tests requested, the person shall be 
warned by a peace officer requesting the test or tests 
that a refusal to submit to the test or tests can 
result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) Following this warning under Subsection (a), if 
the person does not immediately request that the 
chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be 
administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, 
on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate 
notice of the Driver License Division's intention to 
revoke .... 
See Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2)(a) and (b). 
If the person has been (1) placed under arrest, and (2) has 
then been requested to submit to a BAC test, and (3) refuses to 
submit to a BAC test, then, after refusal, and only then, is the 
officer required to give the refusal admonition, that refusal 
results in revocation of license to drive. 
Defendant's argument that he was not informed of his rights 
under the implied consent law is without merit. The record shows 
Officer Newren met his duties under Utah Code § 41-6-44.10. 
Since Defendant was under arrest2 at the time Officer Newren 
requested the blood test, the above quoted Utah Code § 41-6-
44.10(2) (a) and (b) are applicable. 
This statute requires that an officer inform a refusing 
defendant that his/her license may be revoked he/she refuses a 
2
 The court found both probable cause to arrest and actual 
arrest. Suppression Transcript, p. 37, 48. Defendant apparently 
does not contest this on appeal. 
16 
request to submit to a BAC test. Asked what general principles 
he conveyed to Defendant, Officer Newren testified about the 
warning he gave: 
Basically the same as they're written in the 
admonitions of [sic] the back of the [DUI] report form, 
that he does have the right to refuse, if he does this, 
his license can be revoked for one year without 
provision for a limited license. That a result 
indicating .08 or greater could result in denial of his 
license for three months. 
Suppression Transcript, p. 9. 
I indicated that I was drawing the blood for an alcohol 
test, that he could refuse if he so desired, but that 
refusal would indicate that--or indicate that he could 
lose his license for one year without any provision for 
a limited license, and that .08 or greater would result 
in probable suspension of his license for 90 days. 
Id. at 14. 
It is true that Officer Newren explained more than required 
before requesting the test. That is, he gave the refusal 
admonition and he requested the test in one breath so to speak, 
rather than requesting the test, waiting for a refusal, and then 
giving the refusal admonition as contemplated by Utah Code § 41-
6-44.10(2) (b) . Since Defendant consented, Officer Newren did not 
have to give him any refusal warnings, but the warnings were 
given anyway. 
Defendant in the trial court argued that since Officer 
Newren gave the refusal admonition before a refusal, a blood draw 
could only be taken if the defendant immediately requested the 
test, as contemplated by Utah Code § 41-6-44.10(2) (b) . 
Suppression Transcript, p. 28. Defendant in fact immediately 
requested the test when he nodded his head and said "Okay." Id. 
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at 10. 
Officer Newren's admonition prior to a refusal, "surplusage" 
in the trial court's words, and his correctly informing Defendant 
about the potential of a ninety (90) day suspension for a BAC 
level .08% or greater (not a required warning tor a criminal 
case, but required for a civil case under Title 53), can hardly 
be considered prejudicial to Defendant. Id. at 30. There is no 
policy reason to interpret the implied consent law in the 
mechanical manner Defendant urges. 
Case law indicates a common-sense, reasonable communication 
of the implied consent admonitions is acceptable. In Olson v. 
State, 698 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1985), the defendant claimed the 
officer's statement that his license "will" be suspended rather 
than "may" be suspended for refusing to submit to a test was 
misleading, thus negating knowing and voluntary consent. The 
court held a reasonable apprisal of the defendant's rights under 
the statute is sufficient for the purposes of the implied consent 
law: 
We hold now that if the arrested person is 
reasonably informed of his rights, duties and 
obligations under our implied consent law and he 
is neither tricked or misled into thinking he has 
no right to refuse[,] ... the test will generally 
be held admissible. 
A fair reading of the entire implied consent law 
indicates that a person arrested for DWUI should 
be warned that his driving privileges will be in 
jeopardy unless he submits to a chemical test. We 
do not think precise words are determinative 
unless the language used by the arresting officer 
was misleading or not entirely clear. 
Id. at 113 (citations omitted); see also, Cowan v. Schwendiman, 
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769 P.2d 280 (Utah App. 1989)(Implied consent law is to be 
construed in a reasonable, practicable manner under the 
circumstances the officer faces.); Town of Mount Pleasant v. 
Shaw, 432 S.E.2d 450 (S.C. 1993)("We agree with those 
jurisdictions which hold that an advisory is sufficient if, 
construed as a whole, it provides the driver adequate notice that 
he may, if he so elects, refuse the test.11). 
In the instant matter, Defendant was at the very least 
reasonably informed of his rights under the implied consent law. 
He was told he could refuse, and he was told of the consequences 
thereof. Suppression Transcript, p. 9, 14. Officer Newren 
reasonably and substantially conveyed the substance of the 
implied consent law to Defendant. Therefore, the trial court was 
correct in rejecting Defendant's argument that the BAC result 
should have been suppressed on the grounds that Officer Newren 
insufficiently conveyed Defendant's rights to him. 
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 41-6-44.10 DOES NOT RENDER 
CHEMICAL TEST RESULTS INADMISSIBLE IN A CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDING. 
Defendant asserts Officer Newren failed to comply with Utah 
Code § 41-6-44.10, and therefore the blood test results should 
have been suppressed. Even if Officer Newren did not properly 
convey the implied consent law to Defendant, his BAC test was 
still properly admitted because non-compliance with Utah Code § 
section 41-6-44.10 does not preclude admissibility of a BAC test 
in a criminal prosecution for DUI, though it may be fatal to a 
civil driver license hearing. 
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At the suppression hearing, the issue was raised whether the 
implied consent admonitions of Utah Code 41-6-44.10 must be given 
as a condition precedent to obtaining an admissible blood test. 
Suppression Transcript, p. 18-20, 25-26. The court ruled as a 
matter of law that communicating the implied consent admonitions 
of Utah Code § 41-6-44.10 is not a condition precedent to 
obtaining an admissible blood alcohol test: 
THE COURT: ... Moreover, I find that the provisions of 
the statute have only one purpose in effect, which is 
to warn a refusing, an arrested refusing person that 
they will be suspended because of the refusal, to give 
them a chance to cure that before they automatically 
lose their license because of the refusal. To the 
extent your motion is predicated on ... the provisions 
of . . . 4 [1]-6-44.10 and on Cruz, I deny the motion. 
Suppression Transcript, p. 27. 
The trial court's ruling on this point is correct as a 
matter of law. Utah law, codified at Utah Code § 41-6-
44.5(1) (b), states as much: 
In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 
41-6-44.10 does not render results of a chemical test 
inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or 
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible 
except when prohibited by the Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution. 
See Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(b)(emphasis added).3 
While the City has not located a Utah case construing Utah 
3
 This section was enacted in the 1993 legislative session 
and was in force on the day Defendant was arrested DUI. See S.B. 
No. 85 (passed 3/01/93, approved 3/16/93, effective 5/03/93); 1993 
Laws of Utah, Chapter 161; contained in, 2 Utah Legislative Report 
1050 (1993) . 
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Code § 41-6-44.5(b),4 there is existing case law supporting the 
proposition that non-compliance with a state's implied consent 
law does not preclude admission of test results in a criminal 
proceeding, even though the non-compliance precludes admission in 
a civil driver license hearing. 
State v. Pittman, 985 N.W.2d 736 (Minn App. 1986), is a one 
car accident DUI case where the issue on appeal was whether the 
officer's non-compliance with Minnesota's implied consent law 
should have resulted in suppression of the blood test. The 
officer's admitted non-compliance was failing to offer a choice 
between two of three available tests (blood, breath, urine) as 
required by Minnesota's implied consent statute. 
After noting a then-recent change in Minnesota implied 
consent law, see supra note 5, the court stated that while non-
compliance with the implied consent law is fatal to admissibility 
in the civil driver license revocation hearing, test results 
acquired in violation of the implied consent law are still 
admissible in a criminal DWI prosecution: 
Compliance with the procedures of the implied consent 
law is a prerequisite to a driver's license revocation 
under the implied consent statute. [citation omitted] 
However, not all procedures of the implied consent 
statute apply to DWI prosecutions. 
Thus, while the results of the chemical analysis of 
4
 Statutes similar to Utah Code § 41-6-44.(1)(b) seem to be 
a fairly new development. See, e.g., State v. Pittman, 985 N.W.2d 
736 (Minn. App. 1986)("This [DWI] statute formerly allowed 
admission of test results in a DWI prosecution only when the test 
was taken voluntarily or pursuant to the implied consent law. 
[citation omitted] In 1984 the [Minnesota] legislature deleted the 
language in section 169.121 which contained this requirement.") 
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Tyler's blood could be used in a prosecution of Tyler 
for DWI, having been legally obtained, the results 
could not properly serve as the basis of a revocation 
of his license pursuant to the implied consent law. 
Because Pittman was convicted under the DWI law, and 
his blood test was otherwise legally obtained, 
compliance with [the implied consent statute] was 
unnecessary. 
State v. Pittman, 395 N.W.2d at 738. 
State v. Halverson, 413 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. App. 1987), is a 
case where the driver was arrested DUI after an accident. The 
arresting officer read Minnesota's implied consent advisory to 
the driver, which the driver understood. The officer then 
offered the driver a urine test, not a choice of a blood or urine 
test, as required by Minnesota's implied consent law. The 
defendant eventually gave two tests, showing a BAC of .17%. In 
the DWI criminal prosecution, the trial court suppressed the test 
results based on the state's failure to offer a choice of a blood 
or a urine test. The state appealed. 
The issue on appeal was, "Did the failure to offer a choice 
between [tests] render the test results inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution?" State v. Halverson, 413 N.W.2d at 860. 
The court held that an officer's failure to comply with 
Minnesota's implied consent statute does not render test results 
inadmissible in a criminal prosecution: 
If the advisory was inadequate as a matter of criminal 
law, it would be suppressed. ... To the extent that 
the test result was suppressed with regard to 
respondent's civil implied consent license revocation, 
the court was correct. ... To the extent the trial 
court suppressed the test result with regard to the 
criminal charges against respondent, however, the trial 
court erred. In a criminal proceeding, compliance with 
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the procedures of the implied consent law is not a 
prerequisite. ... If the urine test was otherwise 
legally obtained, it is admissible. 
Id. at 861 (emphasis in original). 
State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375 (Minn. App. 1991) is a case 
where the implied consent warnings were properly given, the 
driver refused to submit to a test, and a test was performed 
anyway. The results were suppressed, and the appellate court 
affirmed, on grounds not applicable in the instant matter: the 
officer compelled the test after a refusal. 
The City cites Scott, 473 N.W.2d 375, for its instruction 
about the applicability of implied consent laws to criminal 
proceedings. Under implied consent laws, "the onerous civil 
consequence of license revocation is designed to induce the 
driver to submit to testing." Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377. The 
court further stated: 
The minimum one-year revocation for refusal under the 
implied consent statute is hardly a safe harbor, free 
of adverse consequences. [citation omitted] When 
compared with the 90-day minimum revocation for taking 
but failing the test, the civil consequences strongly 
compel the driver to take the test. 
Id. 
Implied consent laws, with their onerous consequences for 
refusal, also provide a way for the government to peaceably 
secure a test: 
Although Schmerber [v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 
(1966)] allows the state to compel an individual 
arrested for driving while intoxicated to submit to a 
blood alcohol test, the legislature has enacted the 
implied consent law to []avoid the violent 
confrontations which could occur when people are forced 
to submit to testing.[] [citations omitted] 
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State v. Scott, 473 N.W.2d at 377. 
In Interest of I.R.L., 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah App. 1987) (rev'd 
on other grounds), this court stated the same principle as 
follows: 
By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a 
driver to lawfully refuse, but cannot remove his 
physical power to refuse. 
The purpose of a warning of license suspension 
following a refusal is to overcome an unsanctioned 
refusal by threat instead of force. It is ... to non-
forcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent. 
Thus, the purpose of such a law is to avoid the 
violence which often attends attempts to forcibly test 
recalcitrant drivers. Through the threat of potential 
license suspension and the specter of use of a refusal 
to submit to a blood test as evidence in any civil or 
criminal action, police may persuade otherwise 
unwilling drivers to submit to the test. Nothing 
suggests a legislative intent to create a consent 
search, but only to create a means of non-phvsical 
persuasion. 
Id., citing State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 393, 398 (Oregon 
1981)(emphasis added). 
The Scott court also discussed the principle that non-
compliance with implied consent laws does not preclude test 
admissibility in a criminal proceedings: 
When the implied consent advisory is not given, the 
results of a blood test may be used in the prosecution 
of a DWI. [citation omitted] However, the results may 
not be used as the basis for license revocation 
pursuant to the implied consent law. 
Id. 
The cases discussed above stand for the proposition that 
where a state has a statute similar to Utah Code § 41-6-
45.5(1) (b) , non-compliance with that state's implied consent law 
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does not render BAC test results inadmissible, so long as the 
test results were not otherwise illegally obtained or admitted.5 
Even if this court finds the cases discussed above 
inapposite to the instant appeal, the City in this point of 
argument urges the court to uphold the trial court's admission of 
Defendant's blood test based on a plain reading analysis of Utah 
Code § 41-6-45.5(1) (b), so long as the Rules of Evidence or the 
constitution do not prohibit admission of the test. 
Assuming Utah Code § 41-6-45.5(1) (b) means what is says, the 
questions become (1) whether the Rules of Evidence precluded 
admission of Defendant's blood test results, and (2) whether 
there was a constitutional violation in acquiring Defendant's 
blood sample. 
THE RULES OF EVIDENCE DID NOT PRECLUDE ADMISSION OF 
DEFENDANT'S BLOOD TEST. 
When Defendant stipulated that his BAC was .15%, he waived 
any evidentiary arguments contemplated by Utah Code § 41-6-
44.5(1)(b). See Suppression Transcript, p. 2-3. No evidentiary 
questions were presented in the trial court. 
5
 The City here assumes that phrases like "otherwise legally 
admissible" used in Halverson, 413 N.W.2d at 861, and "otherwise 
legally obtained" used in Pittman, 395 N.W.2d at 738, allude to 
evidentiary and constitutional requirements similar to those 
contemplated in Utah Code § 41-6-44.5(1) (b) . 
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DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM 
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WAS NOT VIOLATED. 
In Schmerber v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court "found blood testing procedures to plainly 
constitute searches of persons" within the meaning of the fourth 
amendment, stating: 
Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of 
"persons" and depend antecedently upon seizures of 
"persons" within the meaning of that Amendment. ... 
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to 
constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but 
against intrusions which are not justified in the 
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. 
In other words, the questions we must decide in this 
case are whether the police were justified in 
requesting petitioner to submit to the blood test, and 
whether the means an and procedures employed in taking 
his blood respected relevant standards of Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness. 
Id. at 1834. 
This court stated that where a defendant is arrested, the 
suspect's consent may be implied, where the defendant is not 
under arrest, the government must show actual consent. Interest 
of I.R.L., 739 P.2d 1127-28 (1987)(rev'd on other grounds). 
After discussing Schmerber, this court summarized the 
circumstances under which a warrantless search, i.e., 
administration of a blood test, can be justified under implied 
consent: 
(1) There is probable cause to believe the suspect was 
driving or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a statutorily prohibited 
blood alcohol content, 
(2) The suspect was under arrest, and 
(3) The method of extraction of blood was reasonable. 
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Interest of I.R.L., at 1128.6 
(1) There was probable cause to believe Defendant 
drove while under the influence of alcohol or with 
a statutorily prohibited BAC. 
Officer Newren determined Defendant was driving. 
Suppression Transcript, p. 4-5. Defendant did not dispute this. 
There was a strong odor of alcohol coming from Defendant's car 
and from Defendant himself at the hospital. Id. at p. 5-6. 
Defendant's car crossed the center line, causing the collision. 
Id. at 4. Defendant stated he consumed a mixed drink before the 
accident. Id. at 6. Officer Newren performed a horizontal gaze 
nystagmus ("HGN") test "for my own confirmation.11 Id. at 8. The 
court found probable cause based on these circumstances, except 
the court gave no weight to the HGN test. Id. at 48. Cf., State 
v. Curtis, 680 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Idaho App. 1984) (fact that 
officer noted full and empty beer cans in defendant's car at 
accident, smelled strong odor of alcohol on defendant's breath in 
ambulance, established reasonable cause for DUI, thus furnishing 
probable cause to conduct a blood alcohol test). 
(2) Defendant was under arrest. 
The record indicates, and the court found, that Defendant 
was placed under arrest. Suppression Transcript, p. 6, 37. In 
DUI cases, where the officer has probable cause, the officer need 
6
 The City is not certain the I.R.L. court's characterizing 
the constitutional analysis in terms of implied consent is correct. 
Case law discussed infra indicates that consent is not required in 
a criminal case and that violation of implied consent laws should 
be a part of an admissibility analysis in a criminal case only 
where the statutory violation also has constitutional dimensions. 
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not witness the offence to make a warrantless arrest. See Utah 
Code § 41-6-44 (11) . 
(3) The method of blood extraction was reasonable. 
The record shows the circumstances surrounding the draw were 
reasonable. The draw took place at the hospital. Id. at 5. A 
registered nurse drew the blood. Id. at 10. The nurse used a 
standardized blood kit. Id. at 16. Defendant already had 
received separate medical attention, at least to the extent of 
being cleaned up and not bleeding. Id. at 17. The blood was 
drawn one (1) hour and fifty (50) minutes after the accident, 
giving Defendant time to calm down. See Exhibit #1, Addenda. 
The defendant was not surprised by the test, nor did he resist or 
show any sign of undue pain. Suppression Transcript, p. 10. 
Furthermore, as the City argued above, Defendant consented to the 
blood draw. 
Where a registered nurse, using standard methods in a 
hospital setting, withdraws blood from a calm, consenting patient 
who neither resists the test nor seems to show any undue 
discomfort during the test, the clear conclusion is that the draw 
was performed in a reasonable manner. This court has previously 
noted such a blood draw is constitutionally reasonable: 
[S]uch a blood test was a reasonable type of test 
because blood are draws commonplace, the quantity of 
blood extracted was minimal, there was virtually no 
risk, trauma, or pain involved, and it was performed by 
a physician in a hospital environment. Therefore, 
requiring submission to a blood test following a lawful 
arrest is not a violation of the ... right to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Interest of I.R.L, 739 P.2d at 1125. 
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DEFENDANT'S MIRANDA RIGHTS WERE NOT VIOLATED. 
Whether and how Miranda applies to a DUI arrest is a settled 
question in Utah. In Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Utah 
1979), the court stated that in a DUI the only obligation an 
officer has regarding Miranda is to tell a DUI suspect that 
Miranda does not apply to the decision to take a chemical test. 
This duty does not even arise unless a DUI suspect asks about 
Miranda or manifests some confusion about Miranda7s 
applicability. 
When the driver manifests to the officer that he does 
not understand his duty under the implied consent law 
in light of the Miranda warning, the officer has a 
responsibility to clarify the driver's rights and 
responsibilities. ... [I]t is incumbent on the 
arresting officer to explain unequivocally ... that the 
rights explained in a Miranda warning to remain silent 
and to consult an attorney do not apply to the decision 
to take a chemical test. 
While an arrested motorist has the right to refuse to 
give statements to a police officer, ... he does not 
have the right to refuse to take a blood test. 
Id. 
In the instant case there is no record evidence showing 
Defendant ever asked about Miranda. Officer Newren, 
consequently, had no duty to explain to Defendant the 
inapplicability of Miranda. 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS NOT VIOLATED, 
As to Defendant's right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment, in Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 1979), the 
court cited with approval the following language: 
In other words, we hold that the taking of the 
defendant's blood under the implied consent law was not 
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a critical stage of the criminal proceeding requiring 
the assistance of counsel to preserve the defendant's 
basic right to a fair trial. The Trial Court [properly 
admitted defendant's blood test]. 
Id. at 354; see also, Utah Code 41-6-44.10(7) (no right to counsel 
before BAC test administered). 
EVEN IF DEFENDANT DID NOT CONSENT, DEFENDANTS BAC 
TEST WAS ADMISSIBLE-
Under Schmerber v. California, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966), a 
warrantless seizure of a DUI suspect's blood can be 
constitutional. In People v. Ford, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 189 (Cal. 
App. 1992), the court summarized Schmerber7s application: 
The courts of this state have frequently summarized 
Schmerber as permitting warrantless compulsory seizure 
of blood for the purpose of a blood alcohol test if the 
procedure (1) is done in a reasonable, medically 
approved manner, (2) is incident to a lawful arrest, 
and (3) is based upon reasonable belief the arrestee is 
intoxicated. ... [E]vidence obtained in violation of 
state statute is not inadmissible unless the statutory 
violation also has a constitutional dimension. 
Id. at 190 (emphasis added). 
Ford indicates that compulsory seizure, rather than 
consensual seizure, is authorized, so long as no constitutional 
violation occurs. This is true even in an "unaggravated" case 
like Ford where there was no injury or accident. Id. at 192. 
While implied consent laws often serve to obviate the need 
for compulsory seizure of blood for BAC testing, a non-consensual 
seizure of a DUI defendant's blood for BAC testing can withstand 
constitutional scrutiny. One of the policy reasons underlying 
this rule is that the evanescent nature of alcohol creates an 
exigent circumstance, allowing for a warrantless search or 
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seizure, so long as all the facts and circumstances show the 
officer acted reasonably. This court discussed this concept in 
City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994) .7 
In the instant case, Officer Newren's actions were 
objectively reasonable. In addition to the facts the City 
discussed above regarding consent, other factors show Officer 
Newren acted reasonably: at the time of the draw, about one (1) 
hour and forty-five (45) minutes had passed since the accident, 
thus the two-hour presumptive time limit for admissibility was 
approaching; the encounter between Officer Newren was not 
combative, rather, it was cooperative; and, as the City has 
argued above, taken as a whole, the blood draw was performed in a 
reasonable manner. 
Therefore, even if this court finds no consent occurred, 
Defendant's BAC test was still properly admitted because the 
exigent circumstance of dissipating evidence existed and because 
the manner in which that evidence was gathered was objectively 
reasonable. 
7
 In the trial court, the City did not make this argument. 
However, one exception to the general rule against arguing a issue 
for the first time on appeal "is that we may affirm trial court 
decisions on any proper ground, even though the trial court 
assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 
1341, 1344, note 4 (Utah App. 1991). 
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CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the City respectfully requests this court to 
affirm the trial court's ruling denying Defendant's suppression 
motion. 
DATED and submitted this April 18, 1995. 
Edward A. Berkovich 
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Respondent's Brief to: 
LARRY LONG 
Defendant's Attorney 
225 North State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
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ADDENDA 
Orem Dept. - 4th Circuit Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF OREM CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
SOLOMON, CHRISTOPHER 
663 E 485 S 
OREM UT 84058 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44 DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS 
Plea: Not Guilty Find: Guilty - Bench 
Fine: 1000.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 180 DA Susp: 0 ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: Fine- Prosecutor Spl 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 
Fine Description: Surcharge - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 0.00 Due: 1 
CASE NO: 945000780 
DOB: 02/09/57 
TAPE: 94195 COUNT: 
DATE: 04/29/94 
CITATION: , 
STATUTES 
state agencies having use for the records for accident 
prevention purposes. However, the department may 
disclose the identity of a person involved in an acci-
dent when the identity is not otherwise known or 
when the person denies his presence at the accident. 
The department shall disclose whether any person or 
vehicle involved in an accident reported under this 
section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and 
the name of the insurer. 
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section 
may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the 
department shall furnish upon demand of any party 
to the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate 
showing that a specified accident report has or has 
not been made to the department in compliance with 
law, and if the report has been made, the date, time, 
and location of the accident, the names and addresses 
of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved, 
and the investigating officers. The reports may be 
used as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges 
filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3). 
(3) A person who gives information in oral or 
written reports as required in this chapter knowing 
or having reason to believe that the information is 
false is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987) 
41-6-41. Statist ical information regard ing acci-
den t s — Annual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all 
accident reports and shall publish annually, or at 
more frequent intervals, related statistical informa-
tion as to the number and circumstances of traffic 
accidents. 
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987) 
41-6-42. Local powers to requi re r e p o r t 
A local authority may by ordinance require that 
the operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, or 
the owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated 
municipal department a written report of the acci-
dent or a copy of any report required under this arti-
cle to be filed with the department on accidents occur-
ring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the 
confidential use of the municipal department and are 
subject to Section 41-6-40. 
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987) 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND 
RECKLESS DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and 
reckless driving ord inances — Consis-
ten t with code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs a person's operating or being in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in 
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those 
matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, 
_or_ evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that 
governs any combination of those matters, shall be 
consistent with the provisions in this code which gov-
ern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in 
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this code which govern those matters. 
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987) 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs, or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Mea-
surement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest with-
out warrant— Penal t ies — Suspension 
or revocation of l icense — Penal t ies . 
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual 
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the 
person: 
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concen-
tration of .08 grams or greater as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control; or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any 
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree that renders the 
person incapable of safely operating a vehi-
cle, 
(b) The fact that a person charged with vio-
lating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against 
any charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time 
of a violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person 
has also inflicted bodily injury upon another 
as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exer-
cise that degree of care that an ordinarily reason-
able and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(c) In this section, a reference to this section 
includes any similar local ordinance adopted in 
compliance with Section 41-6-43. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor 
more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-ser-
vice work program for not less than 24 hours nor 
more than 50 hours. 
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or com-
munity-service work program, the court shall or-
der the person to participate in an assessment 
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appro-
priate. 
(ii) For a violation committed after July 
1, 1993, the court may order the person to 
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug de-
pendency rehabilitation facility if the li-
censed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
tation facility determines that the person 
has a problem condition involving alcohol or 
drugs. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation under 
this section the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 
consecutive hours nor more than 720 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-ser-
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vice work program for not less than 80 hours nor 
more than 240 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropri-
ate. The court may, in its discretion, order the 
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug 
dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation commit-
ted within six years of two prior violations under this 
section is a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor except as pro-
vided in Subsections (ii) and (7); and 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the 
prior convictions are for violations commit-
ted after April 23, 1990. 
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 
hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to 
jail, require the person to work in a commu-
nity-service work program for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or 
community-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility, as appropriate. 
(c) (i) Under Subsection (a)(ii) the court shall 
as part of any sentence impose a fine of not less 
than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail sen-
tence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 
2,160 hours. 
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to 
jail, require the person to work in a commu-
nity-service work program for not less than 
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the 
court enters in writing on the record the rea-
son it finds the defendant should not serve 
the jail sentence. Enrollment in and comple-
tion of an alcohol or drug dependency reha-
bilitation program approved by the court 
may be a sentencing alternative to incarcer-
ation or community service if the program 
provides intensive care or inpatient treat-
ment and long-term closely supervised follow 
through after the treatment. 
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or 
community-service work program, the court 
shall order the person to obtain treatment at 
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
facility. 
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a vi-
olation committed within six years of the prior viola-
tions under this section is a third degree felony if at 
least three prior convictions are for violations com-
mitted after April 23, 1990. 
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and impose 
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 
hours nor more than 2,160 hours. 
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to 
jail, require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters 
in writing on the record the reason it finds the 
defendant should not serve the jail sentence. 
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an 
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation 
program approved by the court may be a sen-
tencing alternative to incarceration or com-
munity service if the program provides in-
tensive care or inpatient treatment and long-
term closely supervised follow through after 
the treatment, 
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or 
drug dependency rehabilitation facility. 
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence re-
quired under this section may not be suspended and 
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or pro-
bation until any sentence imposed under this section 
has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a 
conviction for a violation under this section may not 
be terminated. 
(b) The department may not reinstate any li-
cense suspended or revoked as a result of the con-
viction under this section, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the 
department that: 
(i) all required alcohol or drug depen-
dency assessment, education, treatment, and 
rehabilitation ordered for a violation com-
mitted after July 1, 1993, have been com-
pleted; 
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for 
restitution and rehabilitation costs assessed 
against the pers.i have been paid, if the con-
viction is a second or subsequent conviction 
for a violation committed within six years of 
a prior violation; and 
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any 
abusive or illegal manner as certified by a 
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
tation facility, if the conviction is for a third 
or subsequent conviction for a violation com-
mitted within six years of two prior viola-
tions committed after July 1, 1993. 
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), 
(6), and (7) that require a sentencing court to order a 
convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion 
of the court, treatment at an alcohol or drug depen-
dency rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, 
treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
tation facility; or do any combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 
that qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection 
(10). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order 
regarding education or treatment at an alco-
hol or drug dependency rehabilitation facil-
ity, or both, in connection with a first, sec-
ond, or subsequent conviction under Section 
41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction 
under Subsection (10), as the .court would 
render in connection with applying respec-
tively, the first, second, or subsequent con-
viction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), 
(6), and (7). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a 
conviction under Section 41-6-45 that qualified 
as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this 
subsection, a previous conviction under either 
this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabili-
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other education program provided for in this sec-
tion shall be approved by the Department of 
Human Services. 
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea 
of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Sec-
tion 41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, 
an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis 
for the plea, including whether or not there had been 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with the viola-
tion. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of 
the facts that shows whether there was con-
sumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination 
of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the violation. 
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant 
before accepting the plea offered under this sub-
section of the consequences of a violation of Sec-
tion 41-6-45 as follows. 
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's 
plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of 
violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor 
states for the record that there was consump-
tion of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation, the resulting conviction is a 
prior conviction for the purposes of Subsec-
tions (5), (6), and (7). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of 
each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior 
offense for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), 
and (7). 
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, ar-
rest a person for a violation of this section when the 
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the offi-
cer has probable cause to believe that the violation 
was committed by the person. 
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall 
suspend for 90 days the operator's license of any per-
son convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any per-
son convicted of any subsequent offense under Sub-
section (1) if the violation is committed within a pe-
riod of six years from the date of the prior violation. 
(b) The department shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of 
days for which a license was previously sus-
pended under Section 41-2-130, if the previous 
suspension was based on the same occurrence 
upon which the record of conviction is based. 
(as last amended by Chapters 168, 193, and 234, Laws 
of Utah 1993) 
41-6-44.1, Procedures — Adjudicative proceed-
ings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with 
the procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 
46b, in its adjudicative proceedings. 
(as enacted by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1987) 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analy-
sis — Evidence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety shall establish standards for the administra-
tion and interpretation of chemical analysis of a per-
son's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is ma-
terial to prove that a person was operating or in ac-
tual physical control of a vehicle while under the in-
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fluence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, 
documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was 
made and the instrument used was accurate, accord-
ing to standards established in Subsection (1), are 
admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about 
the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which 
made and the method and circumstances of their 
preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards estab-
lished under Subsection (1) and the conditions of Sub-
section (2) have been met, there is a presumption that 
the test results are valid and further foundation for 
introduction of the evidence is unnecessary. 
(as last amended by Chapter 138, Laws of Utah 1987) 
41-6-44.4. Person under 21 may not operate ve-
hicle with detectable alcohol in body 
— Chemical test procedures — Tempo-
rary license — Hearing and decision — 
Suspension of license or operating 
privilege — Fees — Judicial review. 
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance 
abuse authority" has the same meaning as provided 
in Section 62A-8-101. 
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine al-
cohol concentration under this section shall be 
made in accordance with the procedures in Sub-
section 41-6-44(2). 
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age 
may not operate or be in actual physical control of a 
vehicle with any measurable blood, breath, or urine 
alcohol concentration in his body as shown by a chem-
ical test. 
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license 
who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any 
other applicable penalties arising out of the inci-
dent, shall have his operator license denied or 
suspended as provided in Subsection (ii). 
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsec-
tion (a), the Driver License Division of the 
Department of Public Safety shall deny the 
person's operator license if ordered or not 
challenged under this section for a period of 
90 days beginning on the 30th day after the 
date of the arrest under Section 32A-12-209. 
(B) For a second or subsequent of-
fense under Subsection (a), within three 
years of a prior denial or suspension, the 
Driver License Division shall suspend 
the person's operator license for a period 
of one year beginning on the 30th day 
after the date of arrest. 
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an 
operator license who violates Subsection (a), in 
addition to any other penalties arising out of the 
incident, shall be punished as provided in Sub-
section (ii). 
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, which-
ever is longer, a person may not operate a 
vehicle and the Driver License Division may 
not issue the person an operator license or 
learner's permit. 
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable 
grounds to believe that a person may be violating or 
has violated Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in 
connection with arresting the person for a violation of 
Section 32A-12-209, request that the person submit 
dards established by the Division of Sub-
stance Abuse. 
(c) At the conclusion of the penalty period im-
posed under Subsection (2), the local substance 
abuse authority shall notify the Driver License 
Division of the person's status regarding comple-
tion of the recommended action. 
(d) The local substance abuse authorities 
shall cooperate with the Driver License Division 
in: 
(i) conducting the assessments; 
(ii) making appropriate recommenda-
tions for action; and 
(Hi) notifying the Driver License Divi-
sion about the person's status regarding 
completion of the recommended action. 
(e) (i) The local substance abuse authority is 
responsible for 
(A) the cost of the assessment of the 
person's alcohol abuse; and 
(B) for making a referral to an ap-
propriate program on the basis of the 
findings of the assessment. 
(ii) (A) The person who violated Subsec-
tion (2)(a) is responsible for all costs and fees 
associated with the recommended program 
to which the person is referred. 
(B) The costs and fees under Subsec-
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding scale 
consistent with the local substance 
abuse authority's policies and practices 
regarding fees for services. 
(as last amended by Chapters 83 and 234, 
Laws of Utah 1993) 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test resul ts 
in act ions for dr iving u n d e r the influ-
ence — Weight of evidence. 
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceed-
ing in which it is material to prove that a person was 
operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with 
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohib-
ited, the results of a chemical test or tests as autho-
rized in Section 41-6-44.10 are admissible as evi-
dence. 
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance 
with Section 41-6-44.10 does not render the re-
sults of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of 
a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or 
drug content is admissible except when prohib-
ited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two 
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical con-
trol, the test result is admissible as evidence of the 
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of 
the alleged operating or actual physical control, but 
the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given 
to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from re-
ceiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defen-
dant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control. 
(as last amended by Chapter 161, Laws of Utah 1993) 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified of-
fenses may prosecute for cer ta in DUI 
offenses and driving while license sus-
pended or revoked. 
The following class A misdemeanors may be prose-
cuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by 
prosecutors authorized elsewhere in this code to pros-
ecute these alleged violations: 
(1) alleged class A misdemeanor violations of 
Subsection 41-6-44 (6)(a)(ii); and 
(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227, which 
consist of the person operating a vehicle while his 
operator's license is suspended or revoked for a viola-
tion of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which com-
plies with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Sec-
tion 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohi-
bition that the person was charged with violating as a 
result of a plea bargain after having been originally 
charged with violating one or more of those sections 
or ordinances. 
(as last amended by Chapter 234, Laws of Utah 1993) 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for 
alcohol or drug — Number of tests — 
Refusal — Warning, repor t — Hearing, 
revocat ion of l icense — Appeal — Per-
son incapable of refusal — Results of 
test available — Who may give test — 
Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this 
state is considered to have given his consent to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for 
the purpose of determining whether he was operating 
or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or 
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or 
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe 
that person to have been operating or in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under 
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or while under the influ-
ence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol 
and any drug under Section 41-6-44. 
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of 
the tests are administered and how many of them 
are administered. 
(ii) If an officer requests more than one 
test, refusal by a person to take one or more 
requested tests, even though he does submit 
to any other requested test or tests, is a re-
fusal under this section. 
(c) (i) A person who has been requested un-
der this section to submit to a chemical test or 
tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select 
the test or tests to be administered. 
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace offi-
cer to arrange for any specific chemical test 
is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any 
criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding 
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to 
the requested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, 
has then been requested by a peace officer to submit 
to any one or more of the chemical tests under Sub-
section (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical test 
requested, the person shall be warned by the peace 
officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to 
submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of 
the person's license to operate a motor vehicle. 
(b) Following the warning under Subsection 
(a), if the person does not immediately request 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a 
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall 
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver Li-
cense Division, immediate notice of the Driver 
License Division's intention to revoke the per-
son's privilege or license to operate a motor vehi-
cle. When the officer serves the immediate notice 
on behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or 
permit, if any, of the operator, 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for 
only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form ap-
proved by the Driver License Division, basic 
information regarding how to obtain a hear-
ing before the Driver License Division. 
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if 
approved as to form by the Driver License Divi-
sion, serve also as the temporary license. 
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed re-
port, within five days after the date of the arrest, 
that he had grounds to believe the arrested per-
son had been operating or was in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or 
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited un-
der Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under 
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination 
of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 
and that the person had refused to submit to a 
chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(e) (i) A person who has been notified of the 
Driver License Division's intention to revoke his 
license under this section is entitled to a hearing. 
(ii) A request for the hearing shall be 
made in writing within ten days after the 
date of the arrest. 
(iii) Upon written request, the division 
shall grant to the person an opportunity to 
be heard within 29 days after the date of 
arrest. 
(iv) If the person does not make a timely 
written request for a hearing before the divi-
sion, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle 
in the state is revoked beginning on the 30th 
day after the date of arrest for a period of: 
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) 
applies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had 
a previous license sanction after July 1, 
1993, under this section, Section 
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction af-
ter July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(0 (i) If a hearing is requested by the person 
and conducted by the Driver License Division, 
the hearing shall be documented and shall cover 
the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reason-
able grounds to believe that a person was 
operating a motor vehicle in violation of Sec-
tion 41-6-44; and 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test, 
(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the di-
vision or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant 
books and papers; and 
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the at-
tendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees 
and mileage from the Transportation Fund 
in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 21-5-4. 
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Di-
vision determines that the person was requested 
to submit to a chemical test or tests and refused 
to submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails 
to appear before the Driver License Division as 
required in the notice, the Driver License Divi-
sion shall revoke his license or permit to operate 
a motor vehicle in Utah beginning on the date 
the hearing is held for a period of: 
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) ap-
plies; or 
(B) 18 months if the person has had 
a previous license sanction after July 1, 
1993, under this section, Section 
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction af-
ter July 1, 1993, under Section 41-6-44. 
(ii) The Driver License Division shall 
also assess against the person, in addition to 
any fee imposed under Subsection 
53-3-205(14), a fee under Section 53-3-105, 
which shall be paid before the person's driv-
ing privilege is reinstated, to cover adminis-
trative costs. 
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the per-
son obtains an unappealed court decision fol-
lowing a proceeding allowed under this sub-
section that the revocation was improper. 
d) (i) Any person whose license has been re-
voked by the Driver License Division under 
this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudi-
cative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the 
district court in the county in which the per-
son resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in 
any other condition rendering him incapable of re-
fusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for 
in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may be admin-
istered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was 
tested, the results of the test or tests shall be made 
available to him. 
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practi-
cal nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, 
acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw 
blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to taking a urine or breath 
specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical 
nurse, or person authorized under Section 
26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a 
peace officer has reason to believe is driving in 
violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune 
from any civil or criminal liability arising from 
drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own 
expense, have a physician of his own choice adminis-
ter a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the addi-
tional test does not affect admissibility of the re-
suits of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests 
to be taken at the direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to 
the test or tests administered at the direction of a 
peace officer. 
41-6-44.10 (cont'd) 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to 
submit to a chemical test or tests, the person to be 
tested does not have the right to consult an attorney 
or have an attorney, physician, or other -person 
present as a condition for the taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a 
chemical .test or tests or any additional test under 
this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action br proceeding arising out 
of acts alleged to have been committed while the per-
son was operating or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug. 
(as last amended by Chapters I6L. 193, 205, and 234, Laws of 
Utah 1993) 
53-3-223. Chemical test for driving under the in-
fluence — Temporary license — Hear-
ing and decision — Suspension and fee 
— Judicial review. 
(1) (a) If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person may be violating or has violated 
Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operation of a vehicle 
with a certain blood or breath alcohol concentration 
and driving under the influence of any drug, alcohol, 
or combination of a drug and alcohol, the peace officer 
may, in connection with arresting the person, request 
that the person submit to a chemical test or tests to 
be administered in compliance with the standards un-
der Section 41-6-44.10. 
(b) In this section, a reference to Section 
41-6-44 includes any similar local ordinance 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43 
(1). 
(2) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to 
the person's submission to a chemical test that a test 
result indicating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall, 
and the existence of a blood alcohol content sufficient 
to render the person incapable of safely driving a mo-
tor vehicle may, result in suspension or revocation of 
the person's license to drive a motor vehicle. 
(3) If the person submits to a chemical test and 
the test results indicate a blood or breath alcohol con-
tent in violation of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer 
makes a determination, based on reasonable grounds, 
that the person is otherwise in violation of Section 
41-6-44, the officer directing administration of the 
test or making the determination shall serve on the 
person, on behalf of the division, immediate notice of 
the division's intention to suspend the person's li-
cense to drive a motor vehicle. 
(4) (a) When the officer serves immediate notice 
on behalf of the division he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or 
permit, if any, of the driver, 
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate 
effective for only 29 days; and 
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be 
approved by the division, basic information 
regarding how to obtain a prompt hearing 
before the division, 
(b) A citation issued by the officer may, if ap-
proved as to form by the division, serve also as 
the temporary license certificate. 
(5) The peace officer serving the notice shall send 
to the division within five days after the date of ar-
rest and service of the notice: 
(a) the person's license certificate; 
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the of-
fense; 
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the 
division indicating the chemical test results, if 
any; and 
(d) any other basis for the officer's determina-
tion that the person has violated Section 41-6-44. 
(6) (a) Upon written request, the division shall 
grant to the person an opportunity to be heard within 
29 days after the da te of arrest. The request to be 
heard shall be made within ten days of the date of the 
arrest. 
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the divi-
sion in the county in which the arrest occurred, 
unless the division and the person agree that the 
hearing may be held in some other county. 
(c) The hearing shall be documented and 
shall cover the issues of: 
(i) whether a peace officer had reason-
able grounds to believe the person was driv-
ing a motor vehicle in violation of Section 
41-6-44; 
(ii) whether the person refused to submit 
to the test; and 
(iii) the test results, if any. 
(d) (i) In connection with a hearing the divi-
sion or its authorized agent: 
(A) may administer oaths and may 
issue subpoenas for the attendance of 
witnesses and the production of relevant 
books and papers; 
(B) may issue subpoenas for the at-
tendance of necessary peace officers. 
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees 
and .mileage from the Transportation Fund 
in accordance with the rates established in 
Section 2-15-4. 
(e) One or more members of the division may 
conduct the hearing. 
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before 
any number of the members of the division is as 
valid as if made after a hearing before the full 
membership of the division. 
(g) After the hearing, the division shall order 
whether the person's license to drive a motor ve-
hicle is suspended or not. 
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held 
fails to appear before the division as required in 
the notice, the division shall order whether the 
person's license to drive a motor vehicle is sus-
pended or not. 
(7) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or not 
challenged under this subsection, is for a period of 90 
days, beginning on the 30th day after the date of the 
arrest. 
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under 
this subsection is for a period of one year, begin-
ning on the 30th day after the date of arrest. 
(8) (a) The division shall assess against a person, 
in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 
53-3-205(14) for driving under the influence, a fee 
under Section 53-3-105 to cover administrative costs, 
which shall be paid before the person's driving privi-
lege is reinstated. This fee shall be cancelled if the 
person obtains an unappealed division hearing or 
court decision that the suspension was not proper. 
(b) A person whose license has been sus-
pended by the division under this subsection may 
file a petition within 30 days after the suspension 
for a hearing on the matter which, if held, is gov-
erned by Section 53-3-224. 
(as renumbered and amended by Chapters 205 and 234, 
Laws of Utah 1993) 
EXHIBIT 1 
CONSENT FORM 
°
A T
^ . TIME Mw[ 
r r — l . l f \ f i S T T ) | p U r ^o\r^^r r 
NAME OF SUBJECT (PRftsfT) L - * ^ r ^ 
I have granted permission for blood samples 
to h&^afrsrr-
SIGNATURE OF SUBJECT 
BLOOD COLLECTION REPORT 
Subject s Name and Address Bet s Name ana Aaaress * 
ISSN'S //<%&> 
and Time of Arrest £ ano nme o> arrest ^ . 
of Btood Conection f Date ' ' Time 
.eb^sertify tha{<drew, blood samples from the above 
'necy y Y A ( \ / Dal 
Place ll * A M - P M 
I hereb -^se r^tify ^^ r j l l txj -name^J person 
" £l" 
Signed 
-1 hereby cer\»t^that t have witnessed the actual withdrawal of blood from 
the above su&ect by the person whose signature appears above 
Signed Date 
Date and Time of Delivery to LaD and to Whom 
HO*/ Delivered and oy wnom 
Date Test Maoe Result Remarks 
4/89-S 200 «*C 
EXHIBIT 2 
Michael O. Leavkt 
Governor 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF LABORATORY SERVICES 
PUBLIC SAFETY TOXICOLOGY SECTION 
RECEIVED 
FEP ? ?. 199* 
City or Orem 5/^2J£s$\ 
^ 46 North Medical Drive • Salt Lake City, Utah 84113 • (801)584-8400 • FAX-584-8486 L-6Q3.1 S e f V i C G S 
Vs •—J-
TOXICOLOGY REPORT f-V * 
Agency OREM POLICE OEPT. 
Suspect(s) S0L0MAN, CHRISTOPHER 
Laboratory No L94-0263 
Your Agency Case No 
Officer SCOTT NEWREN 
LABORATORY FINDINGS: 
Blood Alcohol: 0.15 percent (w/v) ethanol. 
Analyzed by Bruce Beck . V V ^ 4 ^ 
J jt * 
NOTARY P U B L I C 
tVA 0. SIUCLAIH 
16 M*0*caJ On*'* 
San Lak» Ctt\t *Jt««. SAM3 
Mv Commtaston £xru«*s 
\ugusl8% 199< 
S T A T E O t t l A U 
Sworn and Subscribed to before me this 23 day of February 19 94 
^ r - ^ - ^ ^.^ci- £t <L t^ 
Notary Public 
D - Final Report 
D - Amended Report 
D - Supplemental Report 
D - Additional Results to Follow 
BLANK DUI REPORT FORM 
DUI REPORT FORM 
CASE IDENTIFICATION: 
Date Day Accident Case # Time Prepared 
Subject's Name Address 
Place of Employment Address 
Home Telephone Number Work Telephone Number 
DOB Driver License Number Time of Arrest 
Place of Arrest Charges 
Arresting Officer Arresting Agency 
Assisting Officers 
VEHICLE 
Year Color Make Model 
License # and State Disposition 
Registered Owner Address 
WITNESSES: (If passengers, indicate specifically) 
Name Address Telephone Number Aqe/DOB 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL: 
The facts establishing the subject's actual physical control of a motor vehicle are: 
DRIVING PATTERN: 
Subject's location when first observed 
The facts observed regarding driving pattern: 
PRE-ARREST STATEMENTS OF SUBJECT: 
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Odor of alcoholic beverage 
Speech 
Balance 
Signs or complaints of injury or illness 
Other physical characteristics 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Were tests demonstrated by officer? Subject's ability to follow instructions 
SEARCHES 
A. Vehicle: 
Was subject's vehicle searched? Where? 
When? Evidence 
Person who performed the search 
CHEMICAL TESTS: 
Mr. or Ms. , do you understand that you are under arrest for 
Q Driving under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs or with a measurable amount of a controlled 
substance or metabolite in your body? (41-6-44, 41-6-44.6 UCA) 
Q An alcohol offense under 21 years of age in violation of 32A-12-209 UCA'? 
Response (if any) 
I hereby request that you submit to a chemical test to determine the alcohol (drug) content of your 
blood/breath I request-that you take a test. 
(blood - breath- urine) 
Q The following admonition was given by me to the subject before the chemical test was administered: 
Test results indicating an unlawful amount of alcohol or a controlled substance or its metabolite in your 
breath/blood/urtne in violation of Utah Law, or the presence of alcohol and/or drugs sufficient to render you 
incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle may, result in denial, suspension, or disqualification of your driving 
privilege or refusal to issue you a license. 
What is your response to my request that you submit to a chemical test9 Response 
Did subject submit tg a chemical test9 Type of test 
Test Administered by Where9 
Time Results Was subject notified of results9 
Serial No. of test instrument 
(if the subject refuses the test, read the following) 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject. 
If you refuse the test or fail to follow my instructions, the test will not be given However. I must warn you 
that your driving privilege may be revoked for one year for a first refusal or 18 months for a subsequent 
refusal after July 1. 1993, with no provision for limited driving After you have taken the test, you will be 
permitted to have a physician of your own choice administer a test at your own expense, in addition to the 
one I have requested, so long as it does not delay the test or tests requested by me I will make the test 
results available to you. if you take the test 
Unless you immediately request a test, the test cannot be given Response, if any . 
(if the subject claims the right to remain silent or the right to counsel read tne Tonowingj 
The following admonition was given by me to the subject 
Your right to remain silent and your right to counsel do not apply to the implied consent law which is civil in 
nature and separate from the cnminal charges Your right to remain silent does not give you the right to 
refuse to take the test You do not have the right to have counsel during the test procedure Unless you 
submit to the test I am requesting, I will consider that you have refused to take the test I warn you that if 
you refuse to take the test, your driver's license can be revoked for one year with no provision for a limited 
license 
INTERVIEW 
Was subject advised of the following rights9 When9 
By Whom Where9 
1 You have the right to remain silent 
2 Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law 
3 You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while you are being 
questioned If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you before 
any questioning, if you wish one 
4 If you decide to answer questions now without having counsel present, you may stop answering 
questions at any time Also, you may request counsel at any time during questioning 
Were the following waiver questions asked9 
1 Do you understand each of these right I have explained to you9 
Response 
2 Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now9 
Response ___ 
Were you operating vehicle9 
Where were you going9 
What street or highway were you on9 _ 
Direction of travel9 
Where did you start from9 
When9 What time is it now9 
What is today s date9 Day of week9 
(Actual time Date Day of Week9 ) 
What city or county are you in now9 
What were you doing during the last three hours9 
Have you been drinking9 
What9 How much9 
Where9 
When did you have your first drink9 Last drink9 
Are you under the influence of an alcoholic beverage (drugs) now9 
Are you taking tranquilizers, pills medicines or drugs of any kind9 
(What kind9 Get sample) 
When did you have the last dose9 
Are you ill9 
(If subject was in an accident, ask these questions ) 
Were you involved in an accident today9 
Have you had any alcoholic beverage or drugs since the accident9 
If so what9 When9 
How much9 
XIII. ATTACHED DOCUMENTS: 
I have attached the following documents to this report: 
1. O Copy of citation/temporary license 
2. !Z] Subject's Utah driver's license or driver's permit 
3. !Zl Traffic accident report 
4. LJ Other documents (specify) 
I hereby certify that I am a sworn Utah Peace Officer, Special Function Officer or Port-of-Entry Agent and 
that the information contained above in this report form and attached documents is true and correct to my 
knowledge and belief and that this report form was prepared in the regular course of my duties It is my 
belief the subject was in violation of Section 41-6-44 41-6-44 4, 41-6-44 6, 32A-12-209, or 53-3-418 UCA 
at the time, and place specified in this report 
Signature of Officer or Agent 
Agency 
Date Time 
The original of this form and the Driver License copy of the Citation must be 
sent within five (5) days of the arrest of the subject to 
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION 
PO BOX 30560 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84130-0560 
